India has been making policies relating to the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector since independence. The 2010 policy guidelines for the water and sanitation sectors have embarked on a new path of water security by identifying and emphasizing the importance of hitherto nagging bottlenecks in sustainable service delivery. This paper attempts to assess these policy guidelines critically and suggest ways to make them effective from the point of view of putting them into operation. This paper argues the following. (i) WASH sector financing needs to be addressed directly with realistic assessment of unit costs and their composition. (ii) Within the WASH sector sanitation needs special focus in terms of planning and allocations. Treating sanitation as an add-on to water would not be enough to improve the sanitation and hygiene conditions. The approach to sanitation needs to be focused on creating demand at the household level, segregating private and public responsibilities in this regard. (iii) Although the new guidelines try to bring a much needed balance between the cost components of new capital investment, they are not clear about post-construction support, especially capital maintenance and ring fencing the allocations towards O&M (operations and maintenance), as well as emphasizing that capital maintenance is critical for sustainable service delivery.
Introduction
India has been investing in the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector since independence. The Government of India (GoI), state government and the local government together have spent over US$35 billion (US$1 ¼ Rs. 45) during the last six decades of planning to provide adequate potable water to more than 90% of the rural people in 1.5 million habitations, which is a major accomplishment in coverage. An average of US$4 billion per annum was spent during the 11th plan period alone (GoI, 2011a) . The share of rural water supply and sanitation in the total plan outlay has remained at around 2% since the 1980s. Of this, the share of sanitation is marginal, accounting for less than 10% . Although these allocations of water and sanitation have helped to improve the coverage, defined as access to water and toilets by households, the objective of achieving 100% coverage remains elusive. According to the 2011 census, only 74% of the rural households have access to public water sources (tap and hand pump (HP)), which are expected to be safe and reliable, although 13% of households get untreated tap water and there are wide variations across the states. HPs, which are unreliable and involve drudgery and time, continue to be the single largest source of water in rural areas (44%).
According to GoI estimates, the coverage of sanitation is as high as 68% (GoI, 2012) . But the census data shows that only 33% of the rural households have access to toilets and 67% of them still defecate in the open. The census figures corroborate 2008/09 National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) estimates and there are wide variations across states. Access to toilets in rural areas is as low as 8% in Jharkhand and as high as 93% in Kerala. While the official estimates of water and sanitation show that Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets are met in terms of access (infrastructure), the actual situation does not seem to support this, especially in terms of usage and quality of services. Although the MDG target on drinking water appears to be feasible, the target of achieving open defecation-free (ODF) status by 2015 appears to be far behind. Water quality is another serious problem in a substantial number of habitations. However, in spite of the chance of overestimation, some of the states would achieve the MDG targets (WSP, 2010) . According to the 2011 census none of the states has achieved ODF status.
In order to improve the sector efficiency and sustainable service delivery, the GoI issued a set of comprehensive guidelines in April 2010 (GoI, 2010b) . These guidelines indicate a marked shift from the infrastructure-driven approach towards addressing source sustainability -in quantity and quality -adequacy, convenience, affordability and equity. Following this, a long-term strategic plan for ensuring drinking water security to all rural households was also prepared (GoI, 2011a) . The strategic plan aims to cover 90% of households with piped water and at least 80% of households with tap connections during the period. The strategy emphasizes achieving water security through decentralized governance with oversight and regulation, participatory planning and implementation of improved sources and schemes. The strategy highlights source sustainability measures, water quality, monitoring and surveillance, convergence of different development programmes, and building professional capacity at all levels. In addition, a draft new National Water Policy 2012 was released (GoI, 2012) to take cognizance of the existing situation and to propose a framework for creation of an overarching system of laws and institutions and for a plan of action with a unified national perspective.
On the sanitation front, central guidelines were released in 2010 (GoI, 2010b) . The Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) including the Nirmal Gram Puraskar (NGP), an incentive programme with awards for 'open defecation free' villages, is an effective step by GoI for promoting sanitation facilities as well as eradicating open defecation practices by information and awareness raising campaigns. According to the Nirmal Bharat Vision (GoI, 2011a) , the strategy is: (i) to create a totally sanitized environment by 2017 through achieving an ODF and clean environment where human faecal waste is safely disposed; (ii) to adopt improved hygiene practices by 2020 through adoption of safe hygiene practices by all at all times: and (iii) effective management of solid and liquid waste by 2022 such that the village environment is kept clean at all times. Important challenges in the case of sanitation include: (i) low usage of toilets; (ii) slippage in villages that have achieved ODF status; and (iii) very poor environmental sanitation including solid and liquid waste management.
Although recent policies are the evolution of various policies over the years, this paper proposes to explore the implementation gaps in these guidelines and to recommend modalities for better operationalization to achieve sector strategies and goals. Some of the important issues in this regard include: (i) what are the major deviations? (ii) how are these policies and guidelines going to impact unit costs and service levels? (iii) how far could these guidelines be operationalized and what could be the institutional requirements? A critical assessment of the new guidelines for achieving the policy objectives was taken up for water and sanitation.
A case study on the costs involved and institutional arrangements required was based on a field study on WASH service delivery. The existing unit costs and service levels were estimated using primary and secondary data from Andhra Pradesh state. The primary data for the case study are based on village and household level data that is drawn from a scientific sample of 187 habitations for the purpose of unit cost estimates and a sub-sample of 107 habitations for assessing the service levels. The sample villages are spread over the nine agro-climatic regions of the state and hence could provide broad representation for generic conclusions. These zones are divided on the basis of rainfall, land use, agricultural practices, and so on. These zones include: (i) high altitude zone (HAZ); (ii) north coastal zone (NCZ); (iii) Godavari zone (GZ); (iv) Krishna zone (KZ); (v) southern zone (SZ); (vi) scarce rainfall zone (SRZ); (vii) southern Telangana zone (STZ); (viii) central Telangana zone (CTZ); and (ix) northern Telangana zone (NTZ). Depending upon the status of WASH services, each village is classified as either fully covered (FC), partially covered (PC) or no safe source (NSS) owing to poor water quality.
This paper is organized in five sections. A historical perspective on policy evaluation is provided in Section 2. A critical assessment of the current policies and their effectiveness in the existing institutional context is discussed in Section 3. A reality check of present costs and service levels and the likely impact of the new policy guidelines on these costs and service levels are assessed in Section 4 using the case study from Andhra Pradesh. The concluding section provides future policy options.
Policy evolution
WASH policies in India were initiated in 1949 immediately after independence with the setting up of the committee on Environment and Hygiene (Table 1) . A nominal allocation of Rs. 30 million (US$0.66 million 1 ) was provided towards rural drinking water and sanitation during the first plan period , whereas, urban water supply and sanitation was provided with Rs. 430 million (US$9.4 million). The first ever National Rural Drinking Water Supply Programme (NRWSP) was launched in 1969 with technical support from UNICEF. An amount of Rs. 2,549 million (US$55.75 million) was spent under this programme on digging 1.2 million bore wells and building 17,000 piped water supply schemes. However, planned investment in rural water sector in independent India started in 1972-73 with the launch of the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP). Under ARWSP , the thrust was to ensure provision of adequate drinking water to the rural communities through the Public Health Engineering (PHE) system. Second generation programmes were started with the Technology Mission in 1986/87, renamed in 1991/92 as the Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission. During this period attention was given to water quality, technology 1 The year 2010 exchange rate of 1US$ ¼ Rs. 45.72 is used throughout the paper. From the governance and institutional perspective the 73rd constitutional amendment of 1993 created the basis of decentralization of WASH services by putting the management responsibilities in the hands of panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) at the village level. The year 1999 could be seen as another landmark year for the WASH sector with the formation of the separate Department of Drinking Water Supply in the Ministry of Rural Development. In addition, the WASH sector was brought under sectoral reforms emphasizing investment sustainability, both technical and financial, progressively moving towards a decentralized institutional framework. The sector reform programme was intended to usher in a paradigm shift from the 'government-oriented supply-driven approach' to the 'people-oriented demand-driven approach', indicating a shifting role of government from that of service provider to a facilitator. The TSC as a part of reform principles was initiated in 1999 in order to ensure sanitation facilities in rural areas with the specific goal of eradicating the practice of open defecation. TSC gave strong emphasis to information, education and communication (IEC), capacity building and hygiene education for effective behaviour change with involvement of PRIs, community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Under the third generation programmes (1999) (2000) , sector reform projects involving community in planning, implementation and management of drinking water-related schemes, later scaled up as Swajaldhara in 2002. Swajaldhara has allowed states/union territories (UTs) to incorporate the principles of decentralized, demand-driven, area specific strategy, taking into account source and system sustainability, finance and management of the infrastructure. The National Water Policy was revised in 2002 with priority for underserved villages in terms of quality and quantity. And India has expressed its commitment to the MDGs to halve the proportion of people at 1990 levels without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015.
During 2005, the GoI launched the Bharat Nirman Programme, with emphasis on providing drinking water within a period of 5 years to 55,069 uncovered and quality affected habitations, along with the slipped back habitations based on the 2003 survey. 2009 saw the merger of all the existing programmes and missions under the uniform programme of National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP) mainstreaming Swajaldhara principles.
The year 2010 was another milestone in the history of WASH policies in India. During this year the Department of Drinking Water Supply was renamed as Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation, and in 2011 it was conferred ministry status for greater focus and functional efficiency to make it a nodal department for the overall policy, planning, funding and coordination of programmes for both drinking water and sanitation in the country. More importantly, the year saw the introduction of new guidelines for drinking water and sanitation, which mark a clear deviation from the earlier policy guidelines. For the first time the guidelines (GoI, 2010a) emphasized the shift away from the conventional approach of normative service levels measured in litres per capita per day (lpcd) and a move towards water security at the household level, which includes equity aspects. The guidelines, in order to ensure water security across locations and socio-economic groups, recognized the importance of source sustainability by allocating 20% of the funds to that end. Substantial allocations were also made for water quality (20%), operations & maintenance (O&M) (10%) and to mitigate the impact of natural calamities/climate change (5%), alongside the allocation for coverage (45% at the state level). The guidelines also propose the devolution of resources and responsibilities to local bodies (Gram Panchayats (GPs), the lowest level of local government in India) with the line departments playing only a facilitating role.
New guidelines for the Central Rural Sanitation Programme (CRSP) were also issued in June 2010 (GoI, 2010c) . These guidelines emphasized a move towards a 'demand-driven' approach called the 'Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC)'. The revised approach places more emphasis on IEC, human resource development, capacity development activities to increase awareness among the rural people and generation of demand for sanitary facilities. This will also enhance people's capacity to choose appropriate options through alternative delivery mechanisms related to their economic condition. The programme is being implemented with a focus on community-led and people-centred initiatives.
TSC also intends to tap children's potential as the most effective advocate of good sanitation practices in their own households and schools, as children are effective change agents. The aim is also to provide separate urinals/toilets for boys and girls in all the schools/anganwadis in rural areas. Rural school sanitation is taken up as an entry point activity for creating awareness. The IEC campaign is to be made specific to the location (region). A decentralized approach is being adopted by involving PRIs; cooperatives, SHGs, NGOs, and so on. Intensive IEC activities, along with entry point activities, would form the start-up activities to bring about behavioural changes and demand for sanitation facilities. Provision of an alternative delivery system, proper technical specifications, designs and quality of installations are provided effectively to fulfil the generated demand for sanitary hardware. The cost composition includes: start-up activities (5%), IEC (15%), market support (5%), infrastructure (subsidies for individual sanitary latrines (ISLs), school and anganwadi sanitation, etc.) (60%), solid and liquid waste management (10%) and administrative costs (5%). Following the new guidelines the Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation was upgraded as a separate Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation in 2011 and in 2012 the new water policy was being introduced.
In conjunction with the new strategic plan for 2011-22, Water Policy 2012, the NRDWP and sanitation guidelines 2010 mark a set of overarching policy guidelines as a sector road map. However, the policies have seldom been implemented fully and monitored effectively with rigor and commitment. As water is a state subject in federal India, the impact of GoI guidelines on states is limited although central allocations and grants are substantial. GoI issues national polices and guidelines, launches large investment programmes and influences states through instruments of policies, financial support/grants and political process. Implementation modalities differ from state to state. Differences in the degree of decentralization and institutional structures, capacities, political imperatives of discretionary allocations widen the policy-implementation gaps. For example, states committed to decentralization opt for implementation through PRIs of governance while others opt for implementation through district water and sanitation committees comprising only bureaucracy. The institutional dichotomy of de jure responsibilities for PRIs that are weak financially, technically and managerially with de facto powers of government departments/water boards poses a serious threat to operationalization of guidelines in letter and spirit. Although water and sanitation is a state subject, decentralization is a constitutional obligation of the states and WASH sector service delivery is mandated to the PRIs. Legally GoI should focus on deepening the decentralization process and the sector funding and topping this up with other grants as an incentive to accelerate decentralized governance.
WASH policies: critical issues for operationalization
An assessment of the policy guidelines highlights three policy/operational concerns viz., (i) water security issues, (ii) institutional and governance issues and (iii) policy paradigm.
Water security and holistic approach
The guidelines stress an holistic approach. However, there is very little that the guidelines offer on account of institutional and budgetary fragmentation. The most critical concern of source sustainability needs the more holistic approach of taking competing uses with conservation and savings in agriculture into account. The complexity of environmental flow dynamics have never been understood scientifically (Batchelor et al., 2012a ). An analysis of the relationship between rainfall-runoff and groundwater-stream flow levels over a period of time in the Narmada basin (Kumar, 2010) shows that groundwater depletion enhances rainfall infiltration, but reduces runoff yields and stream flows. Rigorous analysis and studies are required to incentivize and regulate intersectoral prioritization and transfer of water on the basis of its environmental, economic and social value including equity considerations.
Additionally, although the NRDWP guidelines provide for earmarked funds for source sustainability, most of the investments are engineering-driven, like check dams (small structures across streams to check run-off and store water in a limited way). But, these structures could reduce water flow downstream (for drinking/environmental/agricultural purposes), especially during low rainfall years (Batchelor et al., 2012a) . We need a fundamental U-turn from a production-storage-distribution thrust to source sustainability. The states also use the source sustainability window as yet another hardware funding stream. The same is the case for sanitation where infrastructure allocations are as high as 60% despite the reduction in household subsidies (these aspects are discussed with the support of data in the next section). Although IEC activities get reasonable allocations, the actual expenditure is quite low in most cases. Similarly, allocations for solid and liquid waste management are inadequate. Therefore, actual fund requirements on the ground need proper estimation and expenditure needs to be monitored (see Section 4).
Weak convergence at policy, programme and institutional levels has consistently undermined efforts to achieve water safety and security. GoI, as part of its initiatives in operationalizing 2010 NRDWP guidelines, has now identified about 10 districts in different agro-climatic zones to pilot the concept of village water security. However, the programme is partial as the focus is confined only to 'drinking water security' and does not address the critical factors of sustainable convergence and governance. Moreover, water security plans are carried out at the village level instead of viewing water security at the basin, watershed or aquifer level. A minimum requirement for a water security plan is to prepare the plan at the hydrological unit level or sub-watershed level. The programme also lacks a mechanism for convergence, regulation of competing use and fails to address the issues of groundwater anarchy.
Approaches towards a sustainable WASH service delivery and most of the action research programmes hitherto have been largely focused on improved system performance without adequately addressing the fundamental question of source sustainability, which is an integral part of water security at the micro, meso and macro levels both in the medium and long run. Undoubtedly, research and experiments on improved groundwater sustainability and management, like the Andhra Pradesh Farmer Managed Groundwater System, which focuses critically on demand management (Reddy, 2012) , and the pani panchayat (water council) in Maharashtra state (Deshpande & Reddy, 1990) in India, have generated global best practices. However, critical issues of sustainability of such models at scale have remained as elusive as ever because of (a) institutional fragmentation and convergence challenges, (b) weak process of decentralization and poor capacities of PRIs, and (c) unsustainability of source and related trade-offs, legislation and regulatory frameworks that are either weak or virtually unable to be implemented given the nature of India's huge informal water economy.
Institutions and decentralized governance
Despite all its good intentions, the guidelines are weak in effectively addressing the critical issues of institutional and legal reforms that are essential to create an enabling environment for sectoral change. A drinking water crisis is manifested mainly in terms of poor coverage, inefficient service delivery, exclusion and unsustainability, which are largely managerial issues. Asset management, which is fundamental to O&M efficiency and improved service levels, has been entrusted to weak PRIs/communities. Until the country has resolved the decentralization conundrum, rationalized institutional mandates and capacitated PRIs, there is no clear solution for O&M unsustainability (GoI, 2010c) . Alternatively every state should be allowed to develop contextualized O&M mechanisms. In order to achieve source sustainability, conjunctive use and the question of water rights must be addressed more holistically, delinking land and water rights within a workable regulatory and enforcement model (Reddy, 2009) .
India though has a constitutionally decentralized governance structure, in practice only the roles and responsibilities are distributed between different levels (de-concentrated). The decentralization process has taken place in varying degrees and in most states devolution has been limited to transfer of O&M responsibility (GoI, 2010b) . States have created village water and sanitation committees (VWSC) under Swajaldhara but none of the states could boast functional VWSCs. For instance, in Andhra Pradesh only in four of 107 sample villages are the VWSCs observed to be functional (Ramachandrudu et al., 2012) . PRI centric decentralized governance is still evolving or stagnating. Local government institutions need comprehensive support to carry out their mandates of ensuring service provision. Increasing capacity and competence as part of mainstream public sector reform is badly needed if local government is to play this role fully. Local private sector provision needs to be stimulated and supported to help deliver more professional services and higher (more complex) levels of service. Strong PRIs, however, are an essential prerequisite for nurturing an effective and accountable professional private sector in WASH services (Kurian et al., 2012) . NGOs should be encouraged to transform from a role as primary providers of services for professional support agencies to PRIs on a competitive basis, supporting community mobilization and advocacy/demand generation, especially in the case of sanitation. Although the guidelines have emphasized decentralized governance and community participation, mainline investments are still heavily supply-driven engineering solutions (see Section 4). In order to operationalize the guidelines, clarity of mandates, roles and responsibilities and building capacities is required.
As PRIs do not have adequate capacities, technical and financial and sector allocations are managed by line departments, which perform mostly agency functions without much ownership. The twin processes of decentralization and sector reform have often left the rural water sector as an orphan, while more obviously 'influential/visible' urban utilities and comprehensive schemes are being managed by public health and engineering departments (PHEDs). Even in relatively well-established states where comprehensive frameworks have been established, local government is often weak, ill-equipped and poorly resourced to carry out the mandate of ensuring water services. Structured support for local government is seldom in place and normally not adequately budgeted for. Lack of meaningful fiscal decentralization remains a core barrier towards sustainability. The options are either to decentralize and capacitate or to mandate the builder/provider who is accountable for maintenance as well.
A major reason for sector failure is weak management and institutional capacity. Given the constitutional mandate of decentralized governance for the country, the options are to (i) make water boards/departments autonomous as a corporate entity and enable them to be technical service providers to PRIs on a competitive service contract, (ii) integrate the lower functionaries of water departments with PRIs, and (iii) allow water boards to bid on a competitive basis for service provision. There is evidence that the role of public sector in supporting PRIs in improving service delivery has a significant edge over the private corporate sector. More importantly, any institutional modality designed in accordance with the local conditions of different states should have the vision of empowering PRIs and not undermining the process, which should be a critical guiding spirit of any guideline.
Participation and voluntarism are key assumptions for stronger and effective institutions according to the guidelines. However, the broad contours of the concept need to be redefined in the changing socioeconomic fabric of rural India. Assumptions need to be recast based on the rational economic behaviour of individuals/communities and the shifting dynamics of social capital. A major reason for unsustainability is the absence of professional/quality technical and other support services for communities and PRIs at affordable rates. The scope for transition from volunteerism to more professional management is evident globally. There are excellent models within the country that facilitate formation of federations of users and support trained water and sanitation (WATSAN) centric microenterprises. The separation of service authority from provision function is essential (Kurian et al., 2012) . Communities retain the ultimate management and decision-making power, through their elected representatives. An adequate framework for regulating such functional specialization and service provision needs to be fostered for a vibrant private sector that competes with public utilities.
Policy paradigm
The NRDWP guidelines and draft national water policy 2012 have indicative bias towards privatization. Contextualized privatization models globally show only mixed results. An ideal framework should be selective market participation subject to the capacity of regulatory governance. Being a state subject, having varying ideological frames and governance capacities, India needs a very cautious and balanced approach on merit. The best intentioned and designed reforms in the water sector may be frustrated if key partners (state governments) work against them. In India where water has become a scarce factor of production, action in the water sector should be consistent with other key economic factors.
The new GoI policy emphasizes a shift towards piped water supply plus house connections. The shift is perfectly in accordance with demand drivers like rate of economic growth, rising expectations and growth in rural populations. At the same time there remain a significant and growing number of those relying on point sources in rural areas, particularly for the poorest populations and most scattered. Studies have shown that typically for every comprehensive scheme around 30% of the households are excluded from services on account of technical and other challenges. Moreover, the guidelines appear to be regressive and biased against scarce rainfall regions; that is a lower norm is acceptable for scarce regions owing to supply constraints. This goes against the inclusiveness principle across regions, when aggregate norms are being raised from 40 to 55 lpcd. Secondly, under the guise of piped connections, there could be a move towards large and comprehensive schemes which are in general not cost effective compared with location-specific small schemes (see Section 4). Hence the choice of technology options will certainly scrutinize for both technical and economic considerations in real terms and not normatively, which is in vogue.
In India it is ironic that water sector reforms are largely in rural areas, leaving relatively rich urban sectors untouched. Even when the rural poor are expected to pay full or partial cost recovery, the urban rich are heavily subsidized. Many peri-urban settlements are unserved and households pay heavily in a vendor-controlled water market. This dichotomy should be addressed seriously in order to ensure effective reforms. The main challenge is in switching from a build-and-rebuild approach to a build-andexpand approach where the GPs maintain their facilities and states invest in expanding systems to meet the demands of a growing population aspiring to higher and sustainable services (Kurian et al., 2012) . The real choice is political, whether as a nation we need satisfied people with sustainable services or short-term political gains from harbouring utilities and providers that are accountable to political leaders and not directly to the people. Once the choice is made, the going is easy; make utilities and providers autonomous and accountable contractually where the weaker sections of the population are subsidized and not the bad utilities.
Although the guidelines emphasize the importance of inclusion, equity and gender, specific measures to ensure inclusive and equitable service delivery have not been spelled out for operationalization. Most often the poor are excluded from service delivery and also they are ill-served (Batchelor et al., 2012b) . Specially targeted approaches giving appropriate and affordable technology options should be offered. Specific strategies are needed for last mile coverage in drinking water and sanitation and generate demand for improved access. More clarity is required for subsidies, targeting and analysis of real outcomes and intergeneration equity. A special indigenous people component plan should be built into the allocations, monitored by independent agencies and the results published to ensure compliance of implementing agencies.
Effective policy guidelines should have the right mix of incentives and disincentives, structure embedded and market or non-market. Water is an economic good. The approach towards tariff, cost recovery, subsidies and cost efficiency is not clear in the guidelines. Basic reforms to alter and ensure provider accountability are not visible in the guidelines. Water tariffs are also to be seen as a way of actively managing demand, setting prices according to long-term marginal costs. There is evidence of elasticity of demand in the household sector making tariffs an effective instrument for water demand management (Saleth & Dinar, 2004) . Additionally, central allocations could be used as a powerful tool to incentivize efficiency; instead profligacy and waste get incentivized. At the utility level, subsidization of inefficiency always leads to poor performance as is evident from the abnormally high (35-40%) unaccounted for water. For communities, there are opportunities for construction of new schemes and no one is accountable for the cost of failures, as if the schemes are designed to fail.
There are contradictions in priorities and policy elements at the national and state levels. These policy gaps and inconsistencies often create serious practical issues in operationalization and implementation. The GoI should invest in infrastructure audit (inventorizing) policies and legislation to create an appropriate institutional framework to vet and audit polices for harmonization and alignment with the national water policy. For instance, the role of a regulatory framework in the rural sector is under debate, however, clear accountability between consumers and service providers is critical, which could develop over time into a formal and more structured regulatory framework. PRIs should have an overarching role both in monitoring service delivery and supporting community-based surveillance of service levels, reliability, quality and demand management.
The creation of regulators in India has not been accompanied by critical reflection on their role or attention to the political, legal and institutional contexts within which they operate, separate from the executive branch of government to make them function independently. By determining entitlements and regulating water trading, the Maharashtra Water Resource Regulatory Authority (MWRRA), initiated in 2005, has to ensure that water goes to the highest value user, which will have significant social consequences (Dharmadhikary, 2007) . Braithwaite (2005) argues that developing countries which have regulatory capacity problems are ripe for responsive regulation in a model of networked governance where state relies heavily on non-state actors to participate in the task. Regulation would have to be guided by a larger substantive framework that makes consideration of the social goal an integral part of regulatory objectives and communities will have a clear decision making and conflict management role (Kumar, 2010) .
Historically, investments in the water sector in India have been largely in the concept of multi-utility systems (MUS), whether it was in the public or community/household domain. Analysis of the trajectory of sector investments has also revealed that traditionally household/community investments have been dominant and focused on water conservation, harvesting, source augmentation and sustainability, all directly or indirectly reinforcing the concept of MUS. Empirical studies have revealed significant externalities and incremental benefits of investments in MUS, when compared to single use service delivery models (Van Koppen et al., 2006) . The linkages have been proved to be significant by way of providing improved health, livelihood/poverty reduction and welfare gains. The reality of MUS and multiple sources needs to be adequately recognized.
The guidelines speak of convergence, however there is no clear cut process/framework to enforce and monitor. Fragmented bureaucracies make uncoordinated decisions, reflecting individual agency responsibilities that are independent of each other. Too often, government planners develop the same water source within an interdependent system for different and competing uses. This project-by-project, department-by-department and region-by-region approach is no longer adequate for addressing water issues. At the operational level, convergence is critical in achieving source sustainability, water security, prioritized allocations and sustainable service delivery.
There are critical gaps in data collection, analysis and monitoring. Externally funded programmes design independent monitoring systems that are rarely harmonized and institutionalized. The sector contradictions are best reflected in the coverage and service level data provided by different sources like the Ministry of Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation (MDWSS), the census, National Family Health Survey (NFHS) and NSSO. India needs to depart fundamentally from normative indicator-based information management systems that could be useful only to harbour inefficient public utilities and to support political agenda. The set of policy guidelines do not offer much clarity on this count. Being futuristic the guidelines should also look forward to a post MDG scenario by developing innovative indicators that capture truthfully the real time field realities in service delivery. Excellent data capture systems using handheld devices in cloud computing environment embedded in a geographic information system (GIS) make a lot of sense in development of water sector towards scientific decisions.
While looking forward at the new policy guidelines, it would be worthwhile to examine why earlier policy measures and guidelines, including the demand responsive approach, were not able to produce intended results. Apparently the key reasons are: (i) lack of political will to implement them in letter and spirit; (ii) the reforms initiatives have been mostly rural, leaving the relatively better off urban sector untouched; (iii) supply-driven free service delivery models though unreliable, coexisted with cost recovery and demand-driven models; (iv) reversal of reform initiatives in many instances including cost recovery leaving the trajectory unpredictable; (v) bureaucratic and institutional resistance to change; (vi) perverse incentives associated with slippage and service failure; and (vii) prevalence of a highly significant informal sector outside the ambit of reforms. The policies are seldom supported by concomitant and essential changes in rules and regulations at the operational level shelving them in practical terms. Often weak legislation without teeth, like the decentralization mandate and groundwater legislation centred on inequitable land-based rules, are typical examples of implementation failures. Even demand responsive and community-driven approaches failed on account of an inadequate empowerment process, weak institutionalization linking to PRIs, unrealistic assumptions of voluntarism, absence of post-construction support (PCS) and handholding and significant exclusion of the poor and marginalized, and reforms that failed to address existing inequities in access to water. Owing to poor implementation monitoring, schemes like Swajaldhara opened the door for private contractors to undermine the principle of community contracting. Reforms have not been aligned and are not coherent with existing legal principles, leading to questionable outcomes under legal scrutiny.
4. Lifecycle cost approach (LCCA) for sustainable service delivery: the case for Andhra Pradesh (AP)
At the state level, investments in the WASH sector are made on the basis of unit cost norms, that is, per household or per capita costs at the state level assuming a lifespan for the systems. These costs are used across the geographical areas irrespective of actual requirements. However, the actual or observed life of the systems does vary across regions owing to variation in hydro-geological conditions, water quality, and so on. The life of the systems could vary even across villages in similar hydro-geological conditions owing to differences in system maintenance requirements. These differences in normative and observed life spans influence unit costs. Besides, the composition of various costs also has an impact on the lifespan of the system. A balanced investment of capital investment, capital maintenance, O&M, source protection, planning and designing, and so on (Fonseca et al., 2011) is expected to enhance the life of system and provide sustainable services. The new guidelines provide various cost components that help sustainable service delivery. Notable among them are source sustainability and climate mitigation investments. At the same time the guidelines miss out important components like capital maintenance.
Unit costs and their composition
4.1.1. Water. When systems and sources work for a full normative life span, the per capita fixed costs work out to be US$50 in the sample villages compared with a norm of US$32 per capita (Figure 1 ). While the RWSS unit costs are almost uniformly allocated across all the regions in the state, the unit costs in reality vary between US$30 in GZ to US$77 in STZ. This brings out two important issues: (i) the real unit costs are substantially higher than the normative unit costs fixed by the department using the standard schedule of rates (SSR) even though they are adjusted to market prices regularly 2 ; and (ii) there are substantial variations in unit costs within and between zones terms of the lifespan of the systems. Differential allocation of resources across locations based on hydrogeological conditions is needed in order to address the differences in unit costs across zones or locations.
Apart from fixed costs, recurrent costs also influence service levels. While capital or fixed costs are one time investments, recurrent costs are incurred on a regular basis in order to maintain the systems. These costs include capital maintenance (CapManEx), direct and indirect support costs (ExDS and ExIDS) and O&M costs (OpEx). At the state level these costs account for US$2.4 per capita per year (Figure 2 ). Across the zones these costs range between US$1.3 in the NCZ and US$4.3 in the STZ. STZ has high capital costs as well as recurrent costs.
The cost composition indicates that capital expenditure on hardware gets higher allocations even with regard to norms, that is, above 50% (Figure 3) . In reality (WASHCost-observed) it gets as much as 85% of the total expenditure. Support costs (SExDS) get about 5% and this too is mainly in the form of salaries and macro planning. At the state level, capital maintenance (CapManEx) accounts for 4% of the total expenditure, although these costs are not part of the present norms. Capital maintenance expenditure is ad hoc, that is, as and when the need arises. O&M costs (OpEx) account for 5% in reality (WASHCost observed) when compared to 19-24% according to the norms. Real expenditure on OpEx is half that of the 10% proposed in the new guidelines. Comparing cost allocations between a normative lifespan and an observed lifespan indicates that most of the O&M might have been diverted to capital maintenance. That is when unit costs are worked out in accordance with the actual life of the systems or separate allocations are made towards capital maintenance; allocations towards O&M would be utilized for the actual purpose. A service ladder approach using four parameters viz., quantity, quality, accessibility and reliability is adopted (Moriarty et al., 2010) . Service levels are assessed in terms of the proportion of households receiving basic and above service levels for the four different parameters (see Table 2 for details), as basic and above service levels correspond with the Indian norms of service levels. The majority of the households (above 50%) get basic and above service levels for three parameters in all the zones (Figure 4) . Accessibility gets the lowest rating with only 15% of households reporting above basic service levels. Across the zones, the SRZ reported the highest proportion (.50%) of households receiving basic and above service levels in all the four parameters. On the other hand, the high altitude zone (HAZ) has the lowest proportion of households receiving basic and above services in all four parameters.
Unit cost versus service levels per technology 4
. The differences in unit costs are not very different between technologies, except that the HP is the cheapest and the combination of three technologies (MPWS þ SVS þ MVS) is the most expensive ( Figure 5 ). When unit costs are plotted against service levels, it is clear that while HP is associated with poor service levels, the most expensive technology provides only a marginally better service, this also applies in the case of quantity, quality and accessibility. On the other hand, single village schemes (SVS) and mini-piped water supply schemes (MPWS) provide relatively better services compared to multi-village schemes (MVS). It may be noted that better quality and accessibility is also associated with buying water . In the absence of buying water, MVS would do well in terms of quality, owing to its dependence on surface water sources. In terms of cost per unit of water, MVS has relatively high unit costs with low service levels when compared to MPWS (Figure 5 ). 4.1.3. Sanitation. Sanitation cost estimates include public expenditure on subsidies and household investments over and above subsidy. At the community level, the major investment includes public or common toilets in schools 5 , public places, anganwadis, drainage systems, solid and liquid waste disposal systems, training and awareness programmes, and so on. All these investments are grouped under lifecycle cost components and come under public expenditure. In the case of sanitation single pit toilets are mostly used although double pit toilets and septic tanks are also in use in a limited way. Therefore, we do not differentiate between technologies in the case of sanitation. Technology is not found to influence the service performance (WSP, 2010). At the present level of coverage, the fixed cost of sanitation is about US$32 per capita at the state level ( Figure 6 ). Fixed costs vary between US$8 in HAZ to US$45 in KZ. Fixed costs are equally shared between households and public expenditure. The variations in costs could be due to the coverage levels rather than cost differences, as these costs are estimated for all the households, that is, with ISL and without ISL. This was done mainly because public expenditure other than subsidies on ISLs are accessed by all the households. In order to arrive at more realistic figures, we have grouped the sample villages in to NGP and non-NGP villages. Access to ISLs in NGP villages is close to 100% and hence unit costs reflect the costs when full coverage is achieved. The fixed cost of provision is as high as US$54 in the case of NGP villages compared with US$22 in the case of non-NGP villages. This indicates that the present allocations need to be enhanced to achieve full ISL coverage. The costs would be much higher if we include other expenditure like solid and liquid waste management. Relative shares of costs indicate that capital costs (public þ household) account for more than 90%, while recurring costs are negligible (Figure 7 ). More importantly, expenditure on software components like IEC is absent. In fact, these investments are more important in the case of sanitation.
When the unit costs are juxtaposed with service levels, access to sanitation is closely associated with costs (Figure 8 ), but, there is no one to one correspondence between costs and use of ISL. Use levels are very low across the zones. This indicates that while public expenditure towards subsidies could improve access, it may not result in usage, unless supported by behaviour change. Usage is a major concern even among the NGP villages (WSP, 2010) . In this context, the reduction in household subsidies in the new guidelines is in the right direction, although effective enforcement is yet to be seen. In addition, even after reduction the share of these subsidies is as high as 60%. This calls for a rethink regarding the way sanitation is perceived at the policy level.
Conclusions
The new guidelines for both water and sanitation could provide a fillip to the WASH sector in India if they are implemented in letter and spirit. These guidelines provide a new direction to the sector in terms of moving towards sustainable service delivery. However, the guidelines need further strengthening in order to make WASH security at the household level a reality. Some of the important issues in this regard pertain to financing the sector and the composition of the allocations. Sector financing is an important tool for sector efficiency. With regard to the actual costs, allocation for water and sanitation needs to be enhanced. This should be supported by an appropriate choice of technology (in the case of water), benchmarking services, accountability, and improvement in efficiency. In the case of sanitation, policy ought to have strong focus on demand generation through sustainable behaviour change, improved access to markets in rural areas, targeted financial incentives and environmental sanitation for health outcomes. Adopting LCCA to finance the sector would help to get the unit costs right and the right balance of different cost components for sustainable service delivery. Although separate guidelines are issued for sanitation, it is dovetailed to water for all practical purposes. The need of the hour is to mainstream sanitation with sufficient allocations and planning. This is possible by creating not only awareness but also the necessary infrastructure for safe disposal and management of solid and liquid waste. This calls for a total shift away from the subsidy-driven ISL provision to creating demand for private sanitation.
PCS is another major concern. Allocations to the sector should include capital maintenance on a regular basis so that ad hoc allocations for major breakdowns would not be diverted from the O&M allocations. The impact of this imbalance between capital and other recurrent expenditure becomes increasingly critical when coverage rates start climbing. The result is that water supply systems continue to fall out of service as fast as new ones are constructed. Although the approach has gained dominance as a rural service delivery model in progressively enhancing rural coverage, recent evidence suggests that there are critical second generation sustainability concerns. PRIs/communities require professional market-driven PCS for sustainability. The central government should provide a standard O&M and asset management guideline (designed, tested) and support states to get them implemented.
Strategically India needs to refocus its efforts on sustainable service delivery, moving drastically from the engineering model hitherto followed to leverage the benefits of high investments. The programme will focus on software, build capacities, trigger and sustain change management, and institutionalize accountability and a structured approach towards sustainable services at scale. Apparently now, as universal coverage is near achievement at the macro level, it is time to trigger a shift to sustain the gains of coverage to improved and sustainable service delivery.
The assumption of community management has failed to work because of a lack of ownership, poor cost recovery and inadequate technical and managerial capacities. Both the VWSCs and GPs are weak in discharging the mandate. Over the years it has become evident that professional PCS is necessary to replace voluntarism and rigid and archaic concepts of participation. Local self-government could play a key role in regulation, quality assurance, oversight and coordination. Considering the capacity variations of PRIs in India, different models could be evolved to support the process.
